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IS NUDGING REALLY EXTRA-LEGAL? 
Péter CSERNE 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of the scholarly literature on nudges seems to assume, 
without giving it much further thought, that nudges represent a non-
legal or extra-legal form of regulation.1 Others routinely assume 
nudges to be legal, i.e. capable of being authorized and implemented 
in accordance with the law. Perhaps the term ‘law’ is used in different 
senses in these two contexts. But the issue may run deeper. The 
question about the (extra-)legal character of nudges is not simply 
whether certain regulatory interventions can be implemented legally 
in country X or Y. Rather, it is whether nudges represent a genuinely 
distinct mode of governance, with a corresponding distinct 
normativity.  
In this paper I take a closer look at what makes a mode or 
technique of governance legal and query whether nudges can meet 
these criteria. This I shall do with reference to some of the abstract, 
and sometimes perhaps obscure, conceptual debates on the nature of 
law and the tasks of jurisprudence. Within the confines of this paper, 
I do not provide a fully-fledged theory of the nature of law. But in 
order to spell out the possible, and plausible, answers to the question 
in the title, I discuss some representative jurisprudential ideas and 
debates as to what kind of governance mechanism law is, drawing 
attention to the tension between instrumental and non-instrumental 
views of law and spelling out some conceptual consequences 
regarding nudges. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section I, I briefly discuss the 
term nudge and what is sometimes called “the nudge agenda”. Some 
of the debates about nudges draw on legal arguments or set out legal 
implications. Sometimes they do so by relying on rather 
unsophisticated views on what law is and how it operates.  
One can come to the view that nudges are extra-legal in at least 
two ways. The view that nudges are not legal may follow from the 
intuitive idea that law is (necessarily or typically) linked to coercion. In 
short, nudges are too “soft” to be considered law. One can come to 
the same conclusion through a different route as well. If we focus not 
on law’s typical coerciveness but on one of its arguably necessary 
features: its reason-giving, action-guiding character, then at least some 
nudges can be seen as too “strong” or “crude” to be called law. I 
discuss these two lines of argument in sections II-1 and II-2, 
respectively. In section III I suggest two ways of understanding 
nudges as legal. Section III-1 provides some conceptual as well as 
historical arguments for encompassing nudges into the legal domain 
as conceptually subordinate but practically important instances of 
regulation. In section III-2, inspired by Lon Fuller’s project of 
eunomics I suggest considering nudges in a broader normative 
framework, along with other regulatory techniques; a broader project 
of good governance that is not distinct from law but encompasses 
various forms of legality. At the end it turns out that nudges are not 
obviously and not always legal nor are they necessarily or typically 
extra-legal. This conclusion does not seem very original, nor does not 
qualify as a useful policy advice. But my aim is neither originality nor 
practicality. This paper is perhaps best seen as “philosophical 
reflection” in the Oakeshottian sense, i.e. as “the adventure of one 
who seeks to understand in other terms what he already 
understands.”2 
I - NUDGES AS GOVERNANCE TECHNIQUE 
Let me start with some conceptual clarification as to what nudges 
are, as well as some demarcations as to how they are distinct from but 
related to behavioural economics and libertarian paternalism. Some 
may find these points obvious. They are indeed not too controversial 
in the sense that the important disagreements lie elsewhere. These 
remarks simply serve as a conceptual starting point for the discussion 
to follow. 
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In a recent paper, Hansen discussed extensively the various 
definitions and characterisations of nudge suggested in the literature, 
pointing out some of their shortcomings.3 At the end he came to 
suggest the following explication: “A nudge is a function of any 
attempt at influencing people’s judgment, choice or behaviour in a 
predictable way, that is (1) made possible because of cognitive 
boundaries, biases, routines, and habits in individual and social 
decision-making posing barriers for people to perform rationally in 
their own self-declared interests, and which (2) works by making use 
of those boundaries, biases, routines, and habits as integral parts of 
such attempts.”4 
He adds some important conceptual implications of this 
definition. Thus, a nudge works independently of forbidding or 
adding any rationally relevant choice options, i.e. “command and 
control” type mandatory rules. It is also distinct from “changing 
incentives, whether regarded in terms of time, trouble, social 
sanctions, economic and so forth,” i.e. incentives that would also 
predictably change the behaviour for fully rational agents. 
Importantly, according to Hansen, nudges are also distinct from the 
provision of factual information and rational argumentation which 
would rely on the deliberative rationality of reasonable agents.5  
This last point already indicates one reason why nudge and 
libertarian paternalism should be seen as distinct. Of course, the two 
are related: insofar as nudges are used in order to promote the 
interests of the nudgees, they are instances of libertarian paternalism. 
But information provision can be, and has been, suggested as a 
regulatory technique in the service of libertarian paternalism while not 
being a nudge. A libertarian paternalist may provide factual 
information and rational argument—this would not count as nudging. 
Vice versa, nudges are often motivated by or argued for on the basis 
of libertarian paternalism but this is not at all necessary. Hansen 
argues that for the sake of conceptual clarity, it is sensible not to 
define nudge by the motives of the nudgers or the potential reasons 
for nudging.  
Another obvious distinction is sometimes forgotten. Nudges are 
often discussed, rightly, within comprehensive regulatory programs 
which implement findings of behavioural economics or cognitive 
psychology into public policy. But what makes an intervention a 
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nudge is not the empirical research that may underlie its introduction, 
nor the normative goals that may justify it. Under different normative 
premises behavioural economics may lead to policy implications very 
different from nudging. Furthermore, behavioural economics as an 
academic field is much broader than what policymakers or law 
professors have picked up from it. Many empirical researchers are 
cautious, and rightly so, not to draw far-reaching policy conclusions 
from their findings.6  
Thus, to simplify it somewhat: on the one hand there is empirical 
behavioural research, conducted by scientists, economists, 
psychologist, legal scholars, or any combinations of these, providing 
empirical knowledge. On the other hand, there are various policy 
goals, better or worse, justified or unjustified, proposed by politicians, 
policymakers, citizens, ethicists etc. One among these goals is 
libertarian paternalism which is perhaps best understood as a 
normative benchmark or regulatory idea on what goals the 
government or we collectively should follow and through which 
means. 
Nudges are in a third category, of regulatory tools or techniques. 
What distinguishes them is how they change the normative and 
factual environment of the nudgee. What makes nudges workable, i.e. 
the reason they make a difference is that nudgees are not fully rational 
and fully informed agents. Hansen put forward his explication as a 
“technical” definition, focusing on the way nudges operate, rather 
than on the ultimate purpose(s) they are supposed to serve. If we take 
this instrumental aspect of nudges seriously, we have to say that as a 
conceptual matter, it is possible to talk about nudges which are used 
in a scientifically uninformed way and/or implemented in the service 
of any, perhaps sinister, goal. As it has often been pointed out, private 
parties routinely use nudges in order to manipulate others (family 
members, customers, etc.) in certain directions. In doing this, they 
may be completely unreflective; they may also rely on behavioural 
assumptions, derived from sources as diverse as common sense, folk 
psychology or marketing research. 
Typically, however, and in Sunstein and Thaler’s famous book,7 
nudges are in between two reputable categories: they rely on empirical 
findings of behavioural economics, and are meant to promote or 
achieve policy goals which are regarded as being capable of generating 
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consensus or at least wide ranging support across the political 
spectrum. Based on a set of examples, they suggest implementing 
nudge as a regulatory technique. Over the last decade, this suggestion 
has been picked up by some governments and criticised by various 
academics. Looking at this “nudge agenda”8, one is probably justified 
in guessing that it was Sunstein the lawyer who was more concerned 
with the practical and normative implications. This impression is 
supported by both his subsequent books, Why Nudge?9 and Simpler10, 
and Thaler’s retrospective on the research field he co-founded and 
co-shaped, behavioural economics.11  
Reading through their various relevant publications, Sunstein and 
Thaler are, perhaps deliberately, never very precise about the 
normative goals of nudge: promoting autonomy, promoting 
rationality, respecting choice. Sometimes they claim that nudges are 
merely helping people to achieve their own goals. On other occasions 
they refer, among others, to human flourishing as an objective 
measure of well-being or to goals that they claim to be supported by a 
vast majority. In short, they are not clear at all what is the option 
towards which they want nudges to guide behaviour, how easy opt 
out should be, when is a mandatory rule justified etc. In some sense, 
this is not surprising. Both nudge and libertarian paternalism can be 
seen as sequels of Sunstein’s earlier idea for law and policy using 
measures or techniques that have a broad political appeal, at least in 
the US, without requiring grounded agreement.12 Sunstein, to be sure, 
has never been tired of responding to queries and criticisms13 but the 
responses remain wanting in some respects. One such issue is the 
legality of nudges.  
II - THE EXTRA-LEGALITY OF NUDGES 
The legality of nudges can be problematized at two levels: 
conceptual and normative. I suggest that only after dealing with the 
conceptual questions and in light of the answers to those can we 
sensibly come to ask questions about instituting nudges legally, i.e. 
whether and how particular nudges can be authorised and 
implemented in a particular legal order. To be sure, the latter type of 
practical question has been often raised in the legal literature in recent 
years, not only with regard to US federal and state law, but e.g. with 
respect to EU law,14 in the framework of administrative law,15 or in 
light of certain principles of constitutional law.16 These commentators 
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do not merely raise technical or doctrinal legal questions. Theirs are, 
as it were, the lawyerly versions of the normative questions related to 
broader ethical, political and practical discourses about nudging by 
governments. Some of these normative questions are addressed by 
other contributions in this issue. Yet these are not the only relevant 
questions. In fact, such normative questions already presuppose at 
least an implicit understanding of what legality is. In this section I 
suggest that nudges may seem to fall short of being legal not 
normatively but conceptually and this in at least two ways: by being 
merely “counsel” or by being a kind of direct coercion not respecting 
agency. This is the question to which I turn presently. 
II-1 - Law as obligation vs. nudge as advice  
In this sub-section I discuss the argument that nudges are too 
“soft” or “weak” to be considered proper law. Nudges leave scope 
for choice from a menu or to opt-out of a default position. If law is 
enforced, at the limit by brute force, then nudges which are 
(necessarily or typically) non-coercive cannot really be legal.  
Going back to Bentham and Austin whose jurisprudential views 
are mainly associated with classical legal positivism and the view of 
law as command, it seems easy to jump to the conclusion that the 
avowed non-coercive nature of nudges disqualifies them from the 
domain of law-as-command.17 This idea is simple or perhaps even 
simplistic but it contains a grain of truth. One can, in fact, go further 
back in the history of ideas, i.e. before Bentham, to find arguments in 
support of this view. Not being an intellectual historian, in the 
following I rely on the views of experts and on what seems to be 
accepted view among them. 
In chapter 14 of De Cive and chapter 25 of Leviathan Hobbes 
distinguishes law (command) and counsel.18 Law is command and 
distinguished from another mode of governance, advice or counsel. 
Command is “the mark of law-giving, and accordingly the province 
of the sovereign.”19 Hobbes says that the command is to the benefit 
of the commander but this may be seen as a misleading expression of 
what he means: it is to the benefit of those whom the sovereign is, 
roughly speaking, representing. “The mark of counsel is that while 
also in the imperative mood, it aims at the good of the person to 
whom counsel is given.”20 In contrast to commands, one can choose 
to ignore advice if one so wishes.  
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At first one could see this distinction as relevant for or at least 
analogous to our present discussion of the legality of nudges. The 
reference to the benefit of the advisee and the liberty to follow the 
counsel or not recall libertarian paternalism, and insofar as they cover 
the same subject, also nudges.  
There are some further similarities which draw attention to the 
mechanisms by which counsel or at least a special kind of counsel 
operates. According to Hobbes, in case of exhortations the counsellor 
does not provide reasons, rather he uses some non-rational ways of 
persuasion.21 In Hobbes’s view exhortations are used when counsel is 
given to a multitude, exactly because a single person would ask for 
explanations and reasons, which is much more difficult to provide in 
front of a crowd. He adds that in contrast to counsel by rational 
argument which typically serves the interest of the counselled, 
exhortations serve the benefit of the counsellors, only accidentally 
those who are advised. He also discusses what makes a good or bad 
counsellor. In particular, it is experience and empirical knowledge 
which qualifies someone to be good counsellor. 
In light of this, nudges can be seen as extra-legal as far as they 
operate in a different mode than authoritative precepts: they are 
closer to expert advice on what it is prudent to do than to law which 
claims to have authority to tell what one ought to do. In this view, 
nudges can be seen as merely counsel, too weak to be considered 
proper law.  
This may not fully convince though. To counter this argument 
one can either argue that nudges are indeed not so innocent in terms 
of coerciveness or one can question whether the distinctness of 
legality lies in coerciveness. The first route is viable insofar as we 
follow the above definition of nudges. That definition allows for 
nudges which are coercive in some sense, e.g. seriously manipulative. 
The distinction would then depend on how we think about these 
different kinds of coercion.  
From the context of his discussion, it seems that Hobbes 
considers counsel mainly as an intra-governmental matter. One could 
think of the conceptual features of counsel and especially exhortation 
as relevant in the relations of modern government to citizens. But it is 
less clear whether Hobbes was even conceiving of a government 
operating in the advisory mode. What he says about counsel in De 
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Cive and Leviathan leaves some uncertainty as to which of the several 
differences between command and counsel is the crucial one. If the 
distinction is ultimately between those in power and those who are 
not, then it is not clear whether someone who can command is also 
in the position to give counsel. In other words, a Hobbesian could 
say, nudging by the government is legal simply because it issues from 
the sovereign. 
The second route is also available. Modern legal positivism, while 
relying on Hobbes, as well as Bentham and Austin in some respect, 
seems to have repudiated the view that law is conceptually linked to 
coercion, especially as a kind of command. Granted, law is typically 
coercive, but what is distinctive about law is related to the sort of 
reasons for action it provides. Even before Hobbes, we can find the 
distinction in other authors of early modern philosophy. In fact, the 
distinction between command (or more generally obligation) and 
counsel (or more generally prudence) is known in early modern 
natural law theories more broadly.22 Theorists such as Grotius or 
Suarez both use this distinction, although in different ways, in arguing 
that there can be reasons for agents to act other than their own good. 
Thus, for instance, legitimate laws may demand people doing things 
against their interest. Their theories are not our topic here but remind 
us of the long tradition of thinking about law not merely in terms of 
coercion but in terms of (moral) reasons. Still, the legality of nudges 
does not fit easily into such a framework either: the modus operandi of 
counsel as a prudential reason is different from moral reasons. 
II-2 - Law as normative guidance vs. nudges as manipulation of choice architecture 
These other accounts of law draw attention not to law’s typical 
coerciveness but to one of its other, arguably necessary features: its 
reason-giving, action-guiding character. The view of law as normative 
guidance also seems to suggest that at least some nudges are not legal. 
In fact, in this view nudges or at least some types of nudges can be 
seen as non-legal because they are too “strong” or “crude” to be 
called law. Previously I have argued along these lines when discussing 
whether nudging is compatible with what law assumes about human 
agency.23  
A useful starting point for understanding this view is to consider 
law as being based on implicit or explicit assumptions about its 
subjects, (human) agents. Some of these assumptions are operational, 
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linked to particular legal doctrines, but some are more fundamental, 
linked to law’s general conceptual (or aspirational) features. To 
uncover these assumptions sometimes requires theoretical reflection. 
Relatedly, their content is more controversial. Consider, for instance, 
a general statement like this: “Laws are for humans, not for angels or 
devils.” This statement seems to refer to some very general features 
of human nature or the human condition (arguably, features like 
limited rationality, limited benevolence, relative scarcity) as conditions 
under which it makes sense for a group of agents (not) to have law. 
Herbert Hart’s discussion of the minimal content of natural law is a 
well-known rendition of this idea.24  
Following Hart, Fuller and other legal theorists in both the 
positivist and the idealist camps, and looking at legal doctrines of 
criminal and tort liability as paradigmatic instances, there seem to be 
good reasons to see law as being conceptually (or aspirationally) 
linked to the idea of normative guidance.25 Law as normative guidance is 
a specific mode of governance—it sets rules for responsible agents, 
but does not make it practically impossible for these agents to 
disobey. Law as normative guidance is based on certain assumptions 
about its subjects, including their capacity to reason and 
responsiveness to reasons, of which law is one.26 As Fuller put it:  
To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view of 
man that is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of 
understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.27 
How is this relevant for the legality of nudges? Law’s behavioural 
assumptions set constraints on encompassing empirically informed 
techniques of manipulating choice architecture which disregard these 
assumptions—as long as the assumptions are in place. Some 
regulatory techniques, old and new, behaviourally informed or not, 
seem to disregard agency assumed by law as normative guidance. I do 
not claim that nudges tout court do this; some nudges are innocent in 
this regard. Yet when the regulation/governance/management of 
people operates through physical or technological restriction of their 
action space or manipulates their behaviour in such a way that they 
are forced or tricked into choosing or doing what the regulator 
wanted, without having a (reasonable) opportunity to disobey, we are 
dealing with an instance of governance or social engineering which 
runs counter the ideal of law as normative guidance.  
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These interventions physically (or in the online world, virtually) 
constrain the action space of agents. Road-bumps are the simplest 
example. Sometimes this governance technique is referred to as 
techno-regulation28 but the boundary between this and nudges is 
porous. In effect, both represent kinds of choice architecture. 
Perhaps (techno-)regulation not respecting fully-fledged agency is not 
wrong per se. In some contexts, it may be an acceptable, or even 
commendable, way of managing the behaviour of people. But it can 
be seen as problematic in light of substantive moral or political 
principles, often enshrined in law.  
What we are concerned with here is, however, not these 
normative questions but a conceptual one. Can a nudge be called law 
without providing normative guidance? If law is a specific mode of 
governance, then certain regulatory techniques are more congruent 
with law than others. Let’s assume that some of the practically 
interesting nudges are instances of techno-regulation or intransparent 
manipulation or are in some other sense in tension with the idea of 
law as normative guidance. In order to operate within the domain of 
law as normative guidance, nudges should take certain fundamental 
assumptions about human agency into account. But what sort of 
should is this exactly? How much “cure, manipulation, conditioning 
and propaganda”29 are allowed within law?  
A categorical answer would insist that those instances of 
governance which do not fit into the terms of law as normative 
guidance can be useful, effective and even morally unobjectionable in 
some contexts, but they are not legal. This seems to be the view 
implied by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law, at the end of his famous 
parable about the eight ways of failing to make laws: 
The first act of [...] Rex II, was to announce that he was taking the 
powers of government away from the lawyers and placing them in the 
hands of psychiatrists and experts in public relations. This way, he 
explained, people could be more happy without rules. 30 
This answer is straightforward about the extra-legal character of 
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III - THE LEGALITY OF NUDGES 
The categorical answer provided above is problematic for various 
reasons. The first one can be formulated as a matter of concept-
formation. The second one can be formulated as a matter of exegesis 
of Fuller’s theory. Ultimately, however, both bring us to what could 
be called the normative reasons for conceptual choices. 
III-1 - Juridical law and focal analysis  
The quote from Fuller can be interpreted such that an instance of 
governance which falls short of the ideal of law as normative 
guidance is simply not law. This view not only raises the stakes 
unnecessarily high, it also depends on certain logical and semantic 
assumptions about concept-formation which can be problematized 
themselves. Furthermore, this view is in conflict with the modern 
doctrinal understanding of positive law. One of the alternative, low-
stake answers is this: the focal or central meaning of law is normative 
guidance. The idea of normative guidance is law’s aspiration but 
empirically we can observe other modes of governance that are more 
or less legal—they are in the penumbra of the meaning of the term 
law. While law as normative guidance is the central case of law (it has 
normatively grounded conceptual primacy), it is not necessary that 
law indeed operates this way in every instance, or indeed in the 
statistical majority of cases.31 
This argument can be complemented by some historical and social 
observations. Research on European legal history suggests that the 
tension, or at least the distinction, between law, on the one hand, and 
governance or legally unconstrained policymaking, on the other, has 
characterized Western law for several centuries.32 Law has long been 
associated with courts and judges and their activity, within an 
intellectual and practical domain that the late-medieval legal scholar 
Bracton called iurisdictio.33 It is a domain where lawyers as a 
professional group have developed a body of doctrinal knowledge 
and expertise, in the name of which to attenuate and moderate factual 
and normative claims and decide on their legal relevance or impact on 
the outcome of juridical processes. This juridical mode seems to be 
the primary mode of operation of law in a conceptual sense. 
Responsibility in tort law and criminal law are paradigm examples of 
this idea. Juridical law is backward-looking, holding reasonable 
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individuals accountable to behavioural standards and if they don’t 
meet those, calls them to respond, i.e. finds them responsible. 
In contrast, governance, or what Bracton called gubernaculum, is a 
domain where goals are set by political rulers (democratically elected 
or not) and imposed on human practice more or less directly, 
characteristically without lawyerly intervention. This is the domain of 
regulation and policy, that mode of governance which for much of 
the pre-modern and early modern period of European history was 
taken out of courts’ jurisdiction and left to the wisdom (discretion) of 
the sovereign: taxation, warfare and foreign affairs.34  
Arguably, modern law operates to a large extent in this 
governance mode, i.e. through regulation that does not easily fit into 
the juridical model. This is perhaps not surprising, given that modern 
regulatory law is more concerned with aggregate social outcomes than 
individual behaviour.35 A topical example is migration policy, the goal 
of which is named in a recent EU policy document as “the efficient 
management of migration flows”36—a purpose clearly at odds with 
the idea of law as normative guidance. 
Even though modern law is dominated, statistically, by this 
regulatory mode, the normatively grounded conceptual priority of law 
as normative guidance can still be noticed, at least implicitly, in legal 
terminology.37 While this conveys a heuristic primacy to juridical law, 
nowadays lawyers hardly ever seriously question whether so-called 
‘technical’ or regulatory rules are law in the doctrinal sense. Legal 
doctrine seems compatible with, and flexible enough to incorporate, 
policies that follow a regulatory, or managerial rather than a juridical 
logic. In other words, techno-regulation seems to raise little doctrinal 
concern. And if there are legal concerns, legal principles and doctrinal 
techniques such as human rights, the rule of law or proportionality 
are available for the task of control.38 In fact, modern law is all-
encompassing both in the sense that for any state action some legal 
authorization is needed (this is the core idea of the rule of law rather 
than of men, or the principle of legality) and in the sense that any 
private action is potentially subject to legal rules. Within this broad, 
all-encompassing set are included both law in a narrower juridical 
sense and law that is only loosely or formally associated with the core 
concept.  
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From a practical viewpoint it may seem futile or quixotic to 
question whether formally authorised nudges are legal. But in my 
view legal practice and doctrinal understanding alone cannot settle the 
matter. It is the task of theory to provide, in Hart’s words, a “rational 
and critical foundation for law”.39 To be sure, when explicating the 
concept of law, legal theory as a hermeneutical exercise cannot stray 
too far from its common sense and doctrinal understandings. And 
there is also disagreement on what those rational and critical 
foundations should be. Some theorists are reluctant to link the 
concept of law to substantive moral ideas, thus calling “Brave New 
World-like” regulations non-law, less legal or a perversion of law. 
While they agree that law should ideally operate as normative 
guidance, not as a “goad” or manipulation, they hold this to be a 
moral desideratum not a conceptual matter. More precisely, above a 
certain minimal threshold of what is required by human agency, they 
are ready to talk about law even in case of a “Brave New World-like” 
rule, if it fulfils certain criteria of pedigree. They may add that the rule 
is a practically defective or even morally flawed one. Still, they refer to 
the theoretical and practical benefits from keeping conceptual and 
evaluative matters apart.40 For these theorists, the legality of nudges is 
a non-issue. More precisely, instead of a conceptual issue, it becomes 
either a doctrinal or interpretative question (to the extent positive law 
constrains nudges) or a nakedly moral or political matter (to the 
extent normatively problematic nudges are not constrained legally).  
Perhaps the question whether law’s capability to provide 
normative guidance is a conceptual or a moral matter is the wrong 
question. Perhaps it is better to say that, above a minimal threshold, 
the nature of law is such that this capability is an inherent feature of 
law, not realised to the same degree in each instance. The focal case 
of law would be the one fully conforming to the ideal, while those 
more or less in conflict with it, would be peripheral exemplars. Such a 
focal analysis can make sense of legal practice, and the regulatory 
instruments that figure in it, in both explanatory and normative sense. 
Focal analysis can illuminate why non-transparent or manipulative 
nudges are peripheral instances of law. So the legality of nudges is not 
a dichotomous, black and white issue, but a quality that comes in 
degrees, gradually.  
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III-2 - Legal nudges within eunomics? 
At the end of section 2, I suggested that in The Morality of Law 
Fuller links law conceptually to the ideal of normative guidance. In a 
forthcoming chapter, the Dutch legal philosopher Wibren van der 
Burg argues that Fuller can be understood as identifying law broader 
than legislation, linking only the latter to the idea of normative 
guidance.41 Van der Burg suggests that nudges, although perhaps in a 
different mode than governance by rules, can also be legal. He argues 
that Fuller’s broader unfinished other project called eunomics, as 
presented in his posthumously published collection of essays The 
Principles of Social Order42 is fully compatible with, indeed perhaps 
encompasses nudging. The goal of eunomics is to “uncover the 
organising principles, features of design and participatory 
commitments which constitute different models of social ordering, 
and which make them appropriate for use in a given context.”43  
Law, as discussed in The Morality of Law refers only to legislation. 
In reconstructing Fuller’s views, Ken Winston, the editor of The 
Principles of Social Order, distinguished and characterized five main legal 
processes: contract, mediation, legislation, adjudication and 
managerial direction.44 Each process has a different leading ideal, and 
a different internal morality. Whereas in The Morality of Law, law is 
explicitly distinguished from managerial direction, in this broader 
framework arguably these are merely different types of law. “The 
implication is that there is not merely one internal morality of law but 
that there is a multiplicity of internal moralities: in other words, a 
multiplicity of legalities.”45 
Nudges and techno-regulation can either fall under the category of 
managerial direction or be seen as an entirely new legal process. 
Fuller’s project is open-ended, in the sense that new regulatory 
techniques brought about by advances in empirical research and 
technology can be classified within this broader scheme of processes 
of social ordering.46  
Of course one can raise the question whether the project of 
eunomics is about law only or also other non-legal types of social 
ordering.47 Van der Burg suggests moving away from terminological 
and conceptual issues to more pragmatic ones, although it is not clear 
whether he has the primary practice of social ordering or the 
secondary practice of theory-building in mind: “It is a more 
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productive research strategy to uncover the internal morality of those 
new types or subtypes of law, than merely to observe that there is a 
tension between those types and the internal morality of legislation 
because they do not provide normative guidance. […]A fruitful 
interdisciplinary research strategy might be to uncover these internal 
moralities and epistemes, confront them with empirical insights and 
thus come to an enriched typology. Such a typology might help 
lawmakers and policymakers decide which legal processes are best 
suited to deal with certain types of problems.”48 
This suggests looking at the legality of nudges in a way different 
from the previous ones. If nudges are seen as embedded in this 
broader Fullerian normative framework of eunomics or good social 
ordering, along with other regulatory techniques, the question of their 
legality becomes a non-issue again. More precisely, one can still 
distinguish better and worse nudges according to criteria of the 
internal morality of nudging itself. Furthermore, this framework is 
not incompatible with the empirical observations that most instances 
of regulation are mixed types; they encompass elements of a number 
of processes identified by Fuller. Nudges by governments are usually 
enshrined in legislation or administrative regulation. This suggests 
that nudges are not obviously and not always legal nor are they 
necessarily or typically extra-legal. But under this view legality is at 
most one of the relevant criteria for propriety.   
CONCLUSION 
Of course the answer to the question, ‘when are nudges legal’ 
depends on our understanding of what nudges are and what law is. 
This paper suggested a few conceptual considerations on the kind of 
governance mechanism law is. There is, however, much more at stake 
than drawing conceptual boundaries.  
We have seen that an important reason for thinking about nudges 
as extra-legal instruments can be our conception of law being linked 
to a certain ideal (law as normative guidance). One can ask for a point 
where too much use of techno-regulation or manipulative practices 
would turn a legal system into a regulatory regime that is “less than 
legal”. Regulatory techniques that do not take human agency into 
account would be seen as non-legal in a substantive sense or as 
perversion of the law, even if formally valid or authorised. In other 
words, there seems to be a point where formally valid law becomes 
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something fundamentally different from a mechanism of governance 
of and for reasonable individuals. 
How much substantive normative conclusion can be inferred 
from the “law as normative guidance” ideal? This question is 
pertinent because moral and political controversies are sometimes 
framed as if they were logical or conceptual problems of 
behaviourally informed regulation or the nature of law. Ultimately, 
however, normativity needs to be addressed as a substantive political 
and moral matter. 
In fact, some legal philosophers hold the view that it is a matter of 
substantive political goals or values how to define law. Whether the 
concept of law only includes formal elements, so-called social sources 
and no necessary substantive criteria or, conversely, law is defined in 
terms of the purposes it is meant to serve—this debate itself is fought 
in part in normative terms, i.e. as a debate about what kind of 
authority can be legitimate in a normatively plural society; or which 
understanding of law would allow officials and/or citizens a better 
critical perspective when faced with evil or seriously flawed, i.e. 
morally deficient “laws”. In short, in so-called conceptual debates one 
can hardly avoid seeing disagreements about political ideals and the 
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